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Abstract 
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The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union has just turned a 
decade old (coming into force in 1993). For analysts and practitioners alike, the anniversary has 
provided a good opportunity for stocktaking, to look back and examine the development of the 
EU's external actuation during these years. As the Maastricht Treaty took form in the early 
1990s, the main goal for EU's member states was to overcome the eternal challenge of 
coordinating their national foreign policy positions to such degree that it could be affirmed that 
the EU is 'speaking with one voice' in the international arena. The policy harmonization during 
the era of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the two decades which preceded the 
CFSP had left many unsatisfied, and the end of the Cold War was seen as an unprecedented 
occasion to finally consolidate a 'common' foreign policy. However, in this respect, the past 
decade has been a disappointment to some, in that the evolution of the CFSP has been 
wrought with 'fits and starts,' and the motor seems to have stalled so many times in the starting 
up phase that the Fifteen have not yet been able test the real capacity of their coordinated 
foreign policy.   
 
However, although a true CFSP is far from being achieved, some headway has admittedly been 
made. The member states of the European Union have in the last decade made a visible effort 
to increasingly coordinate themselves on a host of international issues, and one of the venues 
where this has been notable is the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. The purpose of this 
Working Paper is to review the actuation of the Fifteen in the General Assembly since the 
inception of the EPC and examine closer the EU member states’ voting behavior. The Working 
Paper will consider whether or not the EU has become a fairly homogeneous regional bloc in 
the past decade and able to influence the international political environment. This reflection is 
especially relevant in the context of the grand-scale ambitions of the EU and its current member 
states to make the European Union into a significant force in international politics, regionally as 
well as globally, and the key role that the Union is assigning the greater coordination between 
EU and the United Nations as a means to consolidate that goal.1 The EU-UN relations have 
consequently intensified during the past few years, and several new formalized cooperation 
agreements have been signed between the two international entities, the latest in 2001, under 
the guidance of the Swedish EU Presidency (first semester 2001).  
 
 
I. EPC AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
 
 
The desire of the EU to 'speak with a single voice' in international organizations, is not new. 
Already in the early days of the European Coal and Steel Community, the Six would in some 
ways seek to influence the visions and objectives of the United Nations as a block. However, 
differentiated postwar agendas among the Six in the UN context, would not allow the effective 
coordination of their foreign policy views. Thus, in practice, until the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s required a greater harmonization of member states, the joint 
policy influence of the EC was scarce.  
 
The launching of the EPC signified that the Six now were ready to take the first steps towards 
the deepening of their cooperation in terms of foreign policy and security matters. The EPC was 
envisioned to take place among the Nine on issues involving European interests "whether in 
Europe itself or elsewhere where the adoption of a common position is necessary or desirable 
(italics added)."2 A first attempt towards harmonization of positions in an international forum 
appeared in 1971 when the Six proclaimed that they would act as a group in the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation (CSCE, now OSCE).  
 
In terms of the United Nations, one of the first measures taken to strengthen the presence of the 
EC members in the General Assembly was the transformation of the European Commission's 
information office in New York to become an official EC delegation to the United Nations in 1974 
— a year after the Federal Republic of Germany (FDR) became member of the UN. The 
opening of the delegation was a direct response to the need for the Nine to formulate a common 
position on a General Assembly agenda, which, as a consequence of the increasing numbers of 
assertive Third World countries and the consequent introduction of many new divisive issues on 
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the Assembly floor, such as decolonialization and economic development issues. That is to say: 
"[t]he Nine were faced with the challenge of formulating a collective response to a broad 'global' 
agenda beyond their control and sometimes to initiatives that they would rather have avoided."3 
The policy coordination in the General Assembly thus became vital for the Nine and the 
cohesiveness of their group would thus early on become an indicator for the state of the health 
of the EPC, clearly healthier on issues of economic or developmental character than where 
security issues were at stake.  
 
The cohesiveness of the EC member states was not only sourly tested by the Third World 
agenda, but also, and more dominantly so, by the bipolar tension between U.S. and the USSR, 
the security dependence on the Nine on NATO which did not permit to much divergence with 
the U.S. vote, and the fact that two member states held permanent seats in the Security Council 
did not facilitate the harmonization process of the different foreign policies in the framework of 
the EPC.  
 
However, there are some evidence for that gradually the EPC and the Nine as a group became 
a recognized feature in the UN system, as the following anecdote demonstrates: "rumor has it 
that in November 1973, when a joint EEC declaration on the Middle East was circulated for the 
first time in the UN, the Soviet ambassador Yakov Malik asked 'Who are these nine?' Two years 
later, however, the cooperation among the EEC members had been widely acknowledged, and 
the same Ambassador Malik addressed the EEC ambassadors as 'the Mighty Nine' when 
informing them, as a group, of a Soviet initiative on disarmament."4 Moreover, from 1975 and 
onward the internal coordination between the EC member countries would improve, largely 
thanks to the initiatives of (the then) West Germany. In 1975 the EPC Political Committee 
began to hold regular preparation sessions before General Assembly meetings and a working 
group to provide coherence and guidance for matters discussed at the UN was created. In 1977 
an 'early warning' system was established so that contentious issues could be identified at an 
early stage.5 In 1986 the Single European Act (SEA) codified, among its 'Provisions on 
European co-operation in the sphere of foreign policy:' the ongoing harmonization of adoption of 
common positions in international fora and that "the High Contracting Parties shall endeavor to 
adopt common positions" in international institutions and at international conferences which they 
attend.6 
 
The perhaps most interesting feature of the EPC's interaction with the UN system has been that 
very often, in the early years of EPC, the decisions taken in the General Assembly would take 
on the role of the cohesive or the 'glue' between the member states at the time of formulating a 
common position or declaration in the seat of the EC. Resolutions adopted in the Assembly 
served as a policy basis (least common denominator) around which the EPC policy was later 
developed and adopted. The UN thus provided notable influence over the development of the 
EPC during the 1970s and 1980s, this was, for example, the case on many issues related to the 
Middle East. Conversely, on issues where the UN kept out (e.g. the global security regime), so 
did very often the EPC as well.7 The General Assembly was thus a vital vehicle for the EPC 
agenda setting and coagulation of EPC measures, helping to further develop the EPC. 
 
 
II. CFSP AND THE EU FIFTEEN IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY   
 
 
In 1992 Treaty on the European Union created a separate 'pillar' for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), but the essential features of the EPC were conserved and the objective 
of maintaining a common position in international fora remained the same, with the seemingly 
significant difference that rather than to 'endeavor to adopt common positions' the member 
states 'shall coordinate their action' in international organizations and at international 
conferences and uphold the common position in such fora.8 The imperative of supporting a 
common position is thus, in the language of the Treaty on European Union (1993), visibly 
strengthened. However, even according to the stricter wording of the Treaty on European 
Union, the member states are not required to fix one common position previously, nor is it 
foreseen that there should be common positions on all matters.9 One might infer that this 
translates into that a common position adopted by the EU must be upheld by all its member 
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states in any international fora, however, in all cases where no common position has been 
adopted, only 'coordination' is required. What entails by 'coordination' is not very clear, neither 
from the Treaty text, nor from the acquis polítique accumulated during the years of the EU.  
 
In practice, it is the European Community, the first of the three pillars of the Union, embodied in 
the European Commission, which fulfills the main function to watch out for the coherence of EU 
as a group in many United Nations bodies.10 In 1971 the General Assembly granted the 
Commission observer status, which for all purposes means that it may make its views known to 
the Assembly, however, it does not have the right to vote. The observer status for the 
Commission also applies to the Economic and Social Council and in other UN organs and 
subsidiary bodies, however, not to the Security Council. The European Community is 
represented by the permanent representative of the EU member state holding the Presidency of 
the European Union and by a representative from the European Commission. Moreover, the 
European Commission has the exclusive responsibility to represent the Community in areas of 
pillar one, such as trade, agriculture and fisheries11 and it has obtained a special ‘full participant’ 
status in a number of important UN conferences, as well as for example in the UN Commission 
on Sustainable Development (CSD) and in the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF). In 
1991, the European Community was accepted as a member in its own right of the UN’s Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO), with full voting privileges. 
  
The European contribution to the UN organization is perhaps most visible in economic terms. 
The Union and its member states are the largest financial contributor to the UN system, 
estimating during the time period 2001-03 to provide approximately 37 % of the UN’s regular 
budget, 40 % of UN peacekeeping operations and 50 % of all UN member states’ contributions 
to UN funds and programs. The EU is through its Humanitarian Office (ECHO) the second 
largest single contributor to and operational partner in the work of the High Commissioner for 
Refugees. In addition, the EC is the second largest donor to the World Food Program. The 
Union represents more than half of the world's trade is subject to preferential treatment for most 
lesser developed countries and the European Union and its member states give over half of the 
world's total official development assistance (ODA). Moreover, the Union contributes 
substantially to UN preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peace 
building measures around the globe. The Treaty of Amsterdam has further emphasized these 
tasks and the Treaty of Nice laying before the member states the challenge of progressively 
framing a common defense policy. This included a rapid reaction force, civilian crisis 
management capabilities and the creation of permanent political and military crisis management 
organs, which will, if successful, contribute further to UN's peacekeeping programs.  
 
 
III. EU VOTING AND ISSUES IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
 
 
The EU member state holding the EU Presidency represents the Union's common position in all 
other areas and, supposedly, provides the 'single voice' of the European Union in the Assembly, 
a fact that makes the EU voice a very mighty one when the Fifteen all align behind a common 
position – and even more so when the EU’s thirteen candidate countries and a few other 
associates (such as Iceland, Norway, Switzerland etc.) follow suit. However, one cannot say 
that this until today has been the norm, rather, the EU members often pursue individual policies, 
especially on sensitive issues. "In such cases national interests prevail and the Union 
disappears as a political entity in the world arena, giving its place once again to its constituent 
member states."12 
 
To provide an indicator of the cohesiveness of a group of states in terms of voting behavior 
there are several methods. The method chosen here is the widely used classification of the cast 
votes into three categories ⎯ unanimous, two-way split and three-way split. A two-way split 
refers to when at least one of  the member states abstains while the rest vote either ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ 
A three-way split, on the other hand, stands for a situation where at least one member states in 
the group voted ‘no’ while the rest voted ‘yes’, or a situation where at least one member state 
voted ‘no’ while the rest vote ‘yes’ and/or abstained. All cases where one or several EU member 
states have been absent, and thus not participated in the vote in question, are not included in 
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this survey.13 One exception has been made to this rule ⎯ in the 51st session Greece was 
absent during more than 75% of the votes, thus that would have skewed the results.14 
Consequently, the 51st session has been calculated in two ways, showing the voting record 
when Greece is included and excluded (i.e. the latter shows the voting record of only 14 EU 
members) (see Figure 1 below).  
 
It is important to note that not all resolutions taken by the General Assembly go to vote, the vast 
majority are adopted without a vote (see Table 1). During the Cold War era, the share of 
resolutions adopted by a vote was approximately about half of the total number of UN 
resolutions, with reveals the political contentions inherent in the Assembly during those years.15 
The share of resolutions adopted by a vote in the General Assembly dropped in the early years 
of the 1990s to about a quarter of total resolutions, and in the past decade this ratio has 
oscillated between a 20-25%, currently finding a plateau at roughly 20% of all the resolutions 
adopted by vote.  
 
This paper will only focus on the resolution adopted by vote in order to determine general trends 
in the EU voting patterns, while keeping this in mind the picture of consensus in the UN is 
always much higher than can be shown in a study of these characteristics, granted that, for 
example, in the 55th session almost 80% of total number of UN resolutions were adopted 
without a vote. However, by concentrating on the actual votes taken over a longer period of time 
and across different issue areas, the voting pattern reveals important indicators for how 
convergent or divergent a certain cluster of countries in the General Assembly are, and how 
constant their voting alignments are in their voting behavior in UN etc. These indicators help us 
to understand the underlying dynamics of foreign policy interests and loyalties in general and, 
as in this paper, the EU foreign affairs actuation in particular. 
 
Table 1. Resolutions adopted in the General Assembly (1990-2002) 
 
General 
Assembly 
session 
(years) 
Total number of
Resolutions 
adopted 
Resolutions 
adopted 
submitted to a vote
Percentage of 
Resolutions 
adopted with a 
vote 
45          
 (1990-91) 
345 86 25.9 % 
46 
(1991-92) 
309 75 24.3 % 
47           
(1992-93) 
306 75 24.5 % 
48           
(1993-94) 
328 65 19.8 % 
49           
(1994-95) 
332 68 20.5 % 
50           
(1995-96) 
327 71 21.7 % 
51           
(1996-97)   
311 76 24.4 % 
52           
(1997-98) 
304 69 22.7 % 
53           
(1998-99) 
312 61 19.6% 
54           
(1999-00) 
341 69 20.2% 
55 
(2000-01) 
330  67  20.3% 
56 
(2001-02) 
360 67 18.6% 
Source: UN Bibliographic Information System (UN BIS). 
 
 
The difficulty in converging on international matters has been patent in terms of the EC/EU 
voting pattern in the General Assembly over the decades. Four distinct periods can be traced in 
the years spanning 1970 to 2000. During the first decade of the EPC the tendency of the Nine 
was one of growing convergence, reaching an initial 47% of the total number of General 
Assembly roll-calls in 1973, a number which two years later would correspond to 57%. The 
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positive trend of convergence and regularity in votes would continue during the following years, 
reaching a climax during this period in 1978 when 63% of total votes cast by the Nine were 
unanimous. 
  
The following five-year period (1979-1984) would not be able to show such a solid record. 1983 
would be an especially bad year for the cohesiveness of the EC votes where the now Ten voted 
divergently in two out of every three resolutions voted on in the Assembly. This five-years period 
would also see a rise in the number of three way split votes, indicating that the divergence 
among the EC members was increasing. The Ten — with the incorporation of Greece into the 
EC — would find themselves increasingly divided over issues related to the Middle East, 
decolonialization and nuclear arms. 
  
However, things became better in the ensuing five-year period, which first years were to be 
marked by an increasing convergence among the EC members. In the years between 1985 and 
1987 the number of unanimous votes taken by the EC in the Assembly increased to the levels 
of the early years of EPC — almost 50% and the three-way split votes dropped during this 
period to approximately 12%. The positive increase in homogeneous votes can largely be 
attributed to a joint EC stance on South Africa and the convergence in opinions on the nature 
and scope of the UN organization. Notwithstanding, this trend would experiment a stagnation in 
the years which brought the Cold War to a close (spanning 1987-1990), where the only notable 
aspect was that the consensus on Middle East issues continued to rise, while global security 
issues and the stance on apartheid would deteriorate towards the end of this period.16  
 
The last of these four periods — the current (1990- ) — has been characterized by a 
generalized and quite dramatic increase in convergence among the EU member states. The 
percentage of unanimous votes rose from 41,9 % in 1990 to an all-time high of 85,2% in the 53rd 
session (1998) (with the exception of session 51 as already noted above), where the trend has 
since dropped slightly, but on average the convergence is still notable (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 Percentage Agreement among EC/EU member states (1983-2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This upward, positive trend in convergence among the EU member states apparently did not 
experience any negative impact by the 1995 joining of the three neutral countries Austria, 
Finland and Sweden, something that was initially feared by some analysts. Rather in the years 
following 1995, the initial tendency for convergent vote of the Fifteen increased, indicating both 
the already existing high degree of complementarity between the European foreign policy and of 
the national foreign policies of the newcomers, as well as, one might infer, a certain willingness, 
at least initially, of the new member states to adjust themselves to mainstream EU’s positions. 
Source: UN Bibliographic Information System (UN BIS).
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Although this positive upward trend has dropped slightly in the past few years, the average EU 
convergence rate in terms of those UN resolutions voted on still remains remarkably high. 
The greater convergence in EU member states' voting behavior during the period 1992-1998 
could perhaps, in part, be explained by the greater coordination in the foreign policy ambit of the 
European Union after the Treaty on European Union was signed and the CFSP was created. 
However, and more likely, one has also to take into account that the tendency in general in the 
General Assembly is towards greater convergence among all represented states, a fact that is 
illustrated by the sinking number of resolutions which are adopted by vote in the Assembly. 
Moreover, the issues addressed by the General Assembly have also changed markedly in the 
decade after the end of the Cold War. The Assembly's agenda is no longer so preoccupied by 
nuclear arms (where there is now a majority in favor of disarmament and non-proliferation), 
South Africa or decolonialization (issues which have now been replaced with human rights 
issues in general, and as regards to some countries ex. Serbia, East Timor etc. in particular), 
although some issues remain constant on the UN agenda, such as economic development, 
Middle East and UN as an organization. The shift in the UN's issue agenda toward less polemic 
and sensitive issues, has also favored a greater coherence in the General Assembly, in general, 
and, in particular, among the EU member states. In this context it is worth noting, for example, 
that the total number of votes which draw a two- or three-way split vote among EU member 
states have in recent years has dropped and stabilized. Notwithstanding, some issues (nuclear, 
disarmament and decolonialization) continue to remain controversial for some of the Union's 
member states, thus resisting the full convergence of the EU Fifteen in the General Assembly. 
These particular issues often draw a three-way split vote, while among the two-way split votes 
are issues related to national self-determination, the Middle East, declaration of nuclear-free 
zones, the Law of the Sea, economic and social issues regarding North–South relations and, 
until recently,  the repeated UN condemnation of the situation in the former Yugoslavia.17  
 
Many two- and three-way splits are caused by the divergent votes by Great Britain and France, 
which during the 1990s were the two EU member states which most frequently voted 
divergently from its fellow EU members on the mentioned issues. Great Britain and France have 
a historical past of being great powers, which is reflected in their membership of the UN Security 
Council and with a long tradition of independent foreign policy actuation, perhaps making it 
extra difficult for these two countries to fit into a framework where the policies and decisions are 
taken in common. A detailed review of the voting records shows that these two European 
countries are the ones most sensitive regarding issues such as decolonialization, nuclear 
weapons and disarmament. France is especially sensitive on nuclear weapon issues, while UK 
has a soft spot for issues related to its colonial past (apartheid), its status as a great power 
(nuclear weapons) and its special relationship with the U.S. often cause it to vote differently 
from its EU partners. However, it is worth noting that in recent years France and Great Britain 
are coming closer to the EU voting 'mean.'  
 
Another look at the Fifteen's voting record in the General Assembly shows, as Kostakos and 
Bourantonis have found, that there is a 'hard core' of EU member states around which other 
member states group themselves ― the Benelux countries and Germany. As these two authors 
express it, Belgium, Germany, Holland and Luxembourg "seem to be the guardians of EU 
orthodoxy and they are almost always in the majority group among the EU states."18 Moreover, 
voting records reveal that there are groups of EU states which frequently tend to vote identically 
even on controversial and divisive issues, such as, for example, the southern European EU 
member states (Greece, Spain and to a lesser degree Portugal) in terms of, for example, the 
Middle East and Palestinian issues, or the neutral EU countries (Austria, Finland, Ireland and 
Sweden) on issues related to the lesser developed world, such as  disarmament, the transfer of 
technology, and economic and humanitarian assistance etc.  
  
Another notable shift in General Assembly voting alignments is the fact that the EU members 
are increasingly voting with the majority of UN General Assembly countries, i.e. the Union's 
members are becoming more sensitive on issues of the underdeveloped world, and that this 
trend has strengthened in past years is not to wonder due to the EU accession of Sweden and 
Finland with long record and strong policy positions on these issues. This has translated into 
that the EU is, from time to time, seen as the 'spokes-block' for the lesser developed countries 
in the General Assembly, and this newfound political backing could be used to sway the 
international regime in favor of these. If the Union manages to coordinate the voices of all 
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Fifteen, and in the future more member states, the Union may be able to shape the global 
regime on a host of issues more efficiently. 
This is in sharp contrast to both Russia and United States (see Figure 2), especially the latter 
which increasingly is finding itself in minority in the General Assembly, due to its in general 
negative attitude towards this international organization and its particular global agenda as the 
world’s only remaining superpower. The figure shows that while the EU has increasingly more 
policy positions in common with Russia, the EU convergence with the United States in the UN 
General Assembly is in overall declining.19 The greater convergence with the Russian 
Federation must be attributed to the shift in Russia’s foreign policy as a result of the fall of the 
Soviet Union/communism, the loss of its bipolar status as a superpower as well as the adoption 
of a Western-style democracy and market oriented economy. There has thus been a certain 
‘normalization’ of the stance of Moscow in the UN General Assembly vote, making its policy 
position by default edge closer to that of the European Union. In terms of the decline in the 
U.S.-EU convergence this should be attributed both to the European’s firm belief in 
multilateralism and support of the UN as a central institution to their vision of the international 
system, as well as Washington’s converse hesitancy to both. This trend has been especially 
acute since the coming into power of the George W. Bush administration, which is one of the 
most notoriously reluctant U.S. administrations towards the United Nations since the Reagan 
administrations in the 1980s. 
 
 
Figure 2 Percentage agreement between U.S. or USSR/Russia with the EU majority vote 
(EU=100%). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UN Bibliographic Information System (UN BIS). 
 
 
As we have seen, the successive enlargements of the EU has not noticeably affected the EU’s 
overall voting record in the General Assembly. This is a bit unusual, in that according to the 
logic of game theory, the accession to the European Union to become first Nine, then Ten, 
Twelve and Fifteen (and soon to be Twenty-Five), translates into an increase in the number of 
states (players) that will want to influence the foreign policy direction of the Union. The game 
theorist would thus predict that as the number of players swells, the more difficult it will be to 
identify common interests in that the number of potential opinions of what that common interest 
consists of augments. Moreover, there is the problem with 'free-riders' and the temptation for 
one or more player to defect from the common decision which also increases as new players 
are added. Thus, according such a ceteris paribus model, game theory would predict that each 
time the EU enlarges it will experience greater difficulties in acting coherently and producing 
common positions in the framework of the General Assembly, as well as in terms of the 
European foreign policy in particular. However, the empirical research undertaken for this article 
does not, at this time, corroborate this prediction.  
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Rather, one would have to turn to other theories to obtain a logical explanation for the voting 
behavior of the EU member states in the General Assembly. It is necessary to consider both 
structural and domestic level changes. During the Cold War and the bipolar order, world politics 
was predominantly characterized by a East-West split, which according to Voeten can be 
described schematically as "a bipolar continuum that roughly divided the world into three parts: 
the 'Eastern' and 'Western' blocs formed the extreme poles of the continuum and a group of 
'nonaligned countries' formed the center."20 With the end of the Cold War the voting alignments 
of the Assembly as a whole has changed and become more flexible, as the bipolar antagonisms 
has disappeared and the loyalties, incentives and/or threat of sanctions which had held each 
block and client states together for over forty years have been removed. The breakdown of the 
bipolar order has thus led to a situation in which states vote in a way that is less constrained by 
voting alliances (dealignment), however, at the same time one might infer that new voting 
loyalties and alignments are emerging (realignment). The disappearance of the bipolar 
confrontation has also allowed the General Assembly to take on some issues which were taboo 
during the superpower conflict (e.g. international security, global court of justice), the Assembly 
agenda has in other words experienced a growingly new dynamic and greater flexibility in the 
past decade. In this scenario it is possible to see the European Union as a more assertive and 
independent actor in the General Assembly, showing interest for social, economic and 
environmental issues related to underdevelopment of the Third World.  
  
Thus, in Realist theoretical terms we can describe the collapse of the Soviet block as a basic 
shift in power arrangements — a systemic change —, in the sense that the end of the Cold War 
has affected the international distribution of power and the global hierarchy of prestige. 
According to systemic theory states respond to such a shift by adjusting their objectives, 
expectations and interaction with other states.21 This, according to the Realists, explains the 
shift in the alignments of states' voting preferences in the UN General Assembly in the post-
Cold War era, such as for example, that the European Union and the U.S. which during the 
chilliest part of the Cold War voted more homogeneously, now seem to be distancing 
themselves from one another and the European Union appears to have an independent policy 
agenda, even promoting issues which do not please the U.S. (environmental protection, family 
planning etc.). Moreover, Realist theory also points to that new, upcoming powers (ex. EU), 
which gain access to a power position in the international system as a consequence of the end 
of the bipolar order, will try to balance existing powers (U.S., China, Russia), expressed in a 
differentiated voting record in comparison to these great powers. According to this notion the 
UN may serve as a multiplier effect for the interests of the EU and may predict a more 
conflictive situation between EU and its former wartime ally the United States. 
 
Liberal theory, in contrast, argues that changes in the international politics are predominantly a 
result of a shift in the domestic regime. They point to that as a consequence of the end of the 
Cold War and the removal of the bipolar overlay focused of nuclear arms etc. 'new' low-policy 
issues (economic, social etc.) are taking a greater role in domestic politics and, hence, in 
foreign policy. The convergence of positions among EU member states on policy-issues voted 
on in the UN General Assembly is thus a reflection the prominence of these socioeconomic 
issues, the latter which EC/EU members have, in general, always, even during the Cold War, 
been in agreement on. The convergence is thus due to the shift in the UN agenda away from 
controversial, divisive issues towards low-policy issues where the EU member states have an 
easier time to find a common position on. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The member states of the European Union have in the last decade made a visible effort to 
increasingly coordinate themselves on international issues, and one of the venues where this 
has been notable is the UN General Assembly. This Working Paper has examined the actuation 
of the Fifteen in the General Assembly, and provided some indication of EU member states’ 
capacity for coordination in an international forum. The end of the Cold War ushered in a 
noticeable increase in convergence in EU member states' voting behavior in the General 
Assembly. The greater cohesiveness between the EU member states can potentially be 
explained by the greater coordination in terms of the CFSP. However, factors such as that there 
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is a greater overall convergence in the General Assembly (illustrated by the decrease in number 
of resolutions adopted by vote) and the shift in UN agenda, away from nuclear arms or 
decolonialization and towards issues of socioeconomic nature has also helped to increase the 
policy convergence of the Fifteen. The shift in the UN's issue agenda toward less polemic and 
sensitive issues, favoring a greater coherence among the EU member states, has especially 
been notable where Great Britain and France are concerned. These former great powers and 
source of the greatest number of disagreeing votes in the General Assembly, are thus 
increasingly falling in line with the EU voting 'mean.'  
 
                                                 
* Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués is a full-time researcher at the Institut Universitari d’Estudis 
Europeus and web-editor of the Observatory of Mediterranean Politics.  
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